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Abstract
Sometimes individual agents display in their decisions a preference for having more opportunities to
choose from. In this paper this fact is interpreted from a preference for flexibility approach, which
links with the hypothesis that there is some uncertainty or vagueness in the decision maker’s preferences.
We define an asymmetric (but not necessarily transitive, or complete) preference on a finite universe of
alternatives, X, to express that vagueness. Taking this preference as a reference, the notion of preference
for flexibility is described by means of the axiomatic characterization of a class of binary relations over
the possible subsets of X, which are interpreted as opportunity sets. Subsequently, we demonstrate the
relationship between the results and the representation theorem of preference for flexibility proposed by
Kreps [10]. Finally, it is shown how some special orderings of the related literature could be interpreted
as elements of the class characterized here.
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11. Introduction
In certain problems of individual choice, the decision maker has only provisional, or not completely
made up preferences among the alternatives at her disposal. When this happens, and if it is possible to
postpone the final choice, it is plausible to think that she would like the chance to maintain bigger
opportunity sets to choose from. This problem, where future preferences are uncertain, has been called
preference for flexibility in the related literature (see Koopmans [9], Arrow [2], and specially Kreps
[10]). According to the last author, in such situations, preferences on opportunity sets satisfy that “a set
is at least as good as all of its subsets, but may not satisfy ‘revealed preference’, the union of two
sets may be strictly preferred to each one taken separately” (Kreps [10,p.565]). This motivates him
to provide a rationalization of this type of behavior by means of contingent utility functions.
In relation to the preference for flexibility literature, but with a different motivation, there has in recent
years been increasing debate over the individual value of freedom of choice (see Pattanaik and Xu [13],
Bossert [4], Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [5], Gravel [6], Klemisch-Ahlert [8], Puppe [14,15], Sen
[17,18,19] or Suppes [20] among others). In most cases these works turn, more or less exclusively, to
the intrinsic value of freedom of choice, according to which an enlargement of the set of opportunities
always implies a strict improvement of individual welfare (see Sen [18]); that is, the condition satisfied is
that, for any opportunity set A , and for any alternative x not belonging to A , the set A ¨ {x} is strictly
better than A. The desire for a greater range of choice is in this case independent of the uncertainty of the
preferences. In general, the notion of freedom of choice is formalized by means of the axiomatic
characterization of preferences on opportunity sets which reflects such a desire for freedom of choice (it
is better to have more to choose from), while simultaneously being consistent with the ex-ante
preferences on the individual alternatives, or basic preferences (it is better to have good alternatives to
choose from than bad ones).
In contrast with the above mentioned works, the current work returns to the idea of preference for
flexibility. According to the interpretation of the term “preference for flexibility”, an enlargement of the
2opportunity set should strictly improve the agent’s welfare only in some cases; in particular, only if it
allows her finally to select a better alternative than any other she could have selected before the
enlargement. In this case, it is not generally true that any opportunity added to a given set necessarily
implies a strict improvement. This hypothesis leads us naturally to examine the agent’s preferences on
the alternatives individually considered, that is, it seems reasonable to analyze those attributes of the
basic preferences, which give rise to the discrimination between alternatives whose availability is valued
and those whose availability is not.
Therefore, the formalization of the idea of preference for flexibility presented here is in some way
related both with the freedom of choice literature and with works on preference for flexibility: We take
the axiomatic methodology of the freedom of choice literature, but with a “preference for flexibility”
motivation. That is, we axiomatically characterize orderings over opportunity sets coherent with the basic
preference but, in our case, since that preference may be uncertain, it has a particular structure (in
particular, it is supposed to be only asymmetric, and may be clearly incomplete). On the other hand, our
description of the concept of preference for flexibility differs to that of Kreps, whose model lacks any
formal allusion to an underlying binary relation on X.
This approach enables us to show that some paradigmatic rankings of the freedom of choice literature,
such as the cardinalist one (see Pattanaik and Xu [13]), or the leximax (see Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu
[5]), can be axiomatically obtained as coherent with the preference for flexibility idea; that is, sometimes
the apparent intrinsic value of freedom of choice, provided by the mere availability of more alternatives,
may mask some uncertainty as to future preferences. On the other hand, we show the formal link
between both types of formalization of the preference for flexibility concept (the axiomatic
characterization proposed here, and Kreps’ representation theorem).
In order to illustrate the differences between the preference for flexibility idea and the freedom of
choice motivation, let us consider the following example: Let us imagine a student who can choose
between studying Law or Economics at her local university. If, afterwards, this university offers her the
additional option to study Medicine, it seems that her welfare increases in as much as she has more
3opportunities at her disposal, and in consequence, enjoys more flexibility in choosing a career.
However, let us suppose that she loves Economics and would never prefer to be a doctor to being an
economist. In this case, would her capacity to decide be affected by the incorporation of the third option?
We could reasonably assert that the opportunity set {(E)conomics, (L)aw, (M)edicine} provides her with
the same flexibility to choose as {E,L}, because she will never take the alternative (M) if (E) is available.
In contrast, let us imagine another student who prefers (E) or (L) to (M), but who is not yet absolutely
certain of his tastes. In this case, although he values (E) and (L) more highly than (M), it might be
reasonable to think that he would like to keep the third option open if possible; so that, in such
circumstances, the enlargement of the set could plausibly be considered as an improvement in terms of
flexibility.
Examples such as the one above suggest that, in fact, the analysis of the agent’s basic preferences,
and especially in so far as the certainty of these is concerned, is a necessary, or at least, a natural starting
point for the correct study of her desire for flexibility. A first simple step in assessing the importance of
these factors is to distinguish, among the binary relations of preference on the alternatives, between those
which are absolutely certain in nature (the decision maker has no doubt that she prefers x to y, and is
sure that she will never choose y if she can choose x), and those which are not so certain (perhaps the
agent prefers x to y, but is not absolutely sure about her tastes; she cannot claim that she never will
choose y instead of x; lack of information enabling her to evaluate all the aspects of the alternatives could
be a clear motive).
In this work the certain part of the basic preferences is taken as a primitive in the decision process. It
is understood to be the immutable part of the individual’s present preferences, and consequently, the
known portion of her future preferences. This part of her tastes is represented by means of a binary
relation P , which is only required to be asymmetric, but not necessarily negatively transitive, or
complete, in accordance with its nature of total certainty. Sometimes it is quite clear that x is better than
y, and then we write xPy; in other cases it is not possible to assert this so clearly: even if there is a
preference for x, this is not absolutely definite, therefore, x and y are not related through P.
4The structure of P allows for the decision maker being unable to compare certain pairs of elements
with absolute certainty, and for her preference between them being only approximate, allowing for the
possibility of reversal. Also, it could happen that the decision maker might be so sure in her tastes that
she could order all the alternatives by means of P, that is, it is possible for P to be not only asymmetric,
but also a negatively transitive relation. Likewise, the possibility is also admitted of the degree of
uncertainty being great enough to consider P empty. Of course the structure of P includes cases in which
it is, for example, a partial order, or a semiorder.
The above distinction fits in very well with the two notions introduced by Harsanyi [7]: The
preferences such as they are at present or “actual preferences”, and the “well-informed preferences”,
those hypothetical preferences the decision maker would have if she had all the relevant information
about the alternatives and if she made use of it. In the model, P represents the part of the well-informed
preferences that the decision maker knows at present (at the moment of the evaluation of the opportunity
sets).
The information attached to P makes it possible to establish channels for the consistency which, in
terms of preference for flexibility, must be maintained by the decision maker’s comparisons of
opportunity sets. In particular, preferences on opportunity sets are supposed to satisfy a minimal
property: the addition of an alternative to a given set only implies a strict improvement if there is no other
opportunity in the set which, by means of P , surpasses the one added (it is undoubtedly better);
otherwise, the additional alternative does not contribute any flexibility to the choice, and in this sense, the
enlarged set is considered to be indifferent to the original one.
 The described condition establishes restrictions only on comparisons between sets which are
enlargements (reductions) one of the other. Not in vain, have we tried to keep the condition free of any
meaning beyond the mere concept of flexibility in choice. In its strictest sense, only sets related by means
of inclusion would be susceptible to having this characteristic of providing “more (less) flexibility in the
election than” the one contained (containing). This condition will not, therefore, be generally sufficient to
obtain complete orderings on the opportunity sets. The actual extent of the property lies in the fact that it
5restricts the cases in which set enlargements actually increase their flexibility. In fact, there is a wide
range of incomplete orders which verify the axiom, but this paper will focus mainly on those which are
complete. Also, the proposed formalization makes it possible to experiment with the connection between
the degree of uncertainty in the agent’s tastes, and her wish for flexibility when choosing sets.
Consequently, the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 contains the notation and proposes a
definition of the relations on sets which are consistent in terms of preference for flexibility with a given
preference P. Section 3 holds the main results of the paper; among them, an axiomatic characterization of
the class of relations over sets defined previously; and a representation theorem for the complete
orderings which are consistent with a certain P . In Section 4 we present some special examples of
orderings, taken from the freedom of choice literature, which can be interpreted as particular cases of
consistency in terms of preference for flexibility. Section 6 contains some final remarks.
2. Notation and definitions.
´  (´ +) will denote the set of all the real numbers (all the positives).
Let X be a finite set of alternatives, and #X=n; 2X will represent the set of all the non-empty subsets of
X. Sometimes, we will refer to the elements of X as the “basic alternatives”.
Let P ⊆ X2  be a binary relation defined on X , it will be denoted xPy when (x,y) ˛ P. In the present
context, P represents the absolutely certain part of the agent’s preferences, and must be read as “is
undoubtedly better than”. According to this, P will be said to be a certain preference relation, and will
be supposed to be asymmetric.
Let @⊂ 2X X 2X be a binary relation defined on 2X. As usual, A@B will indicate that “the set A is
preferred to B”. At first, no particular structure will be imposed on @,  although, the paper will
concentrate mainly on the case in which @ is an asymmetric and negatively transitive binary relation, and
6then, $ defined by: A$B if ¬(B@A), where ¬ denotes logical negation, is a complete and transitive
ordering on 2X, and the associated relation ~ is an equivalence relation.
The formal goal of this work is to investigate possible binary relations on subsets of X which are
consistent in terms of preference for flexibility with the relation P: We express this by the following
definition:
Definition : Let P be an asymmetric binary relation defined on X . It will be said that a binary relation
$⊂ 2X X 2X is P-consistent in terms of preference for flexibility if it satisfies the following condition:
 "  A ˛ 2X, "  x ˛ X/A, 
  
A x A a A a Px
A x A






                 otherwisef
 (2.1)
3. Main results.
First, we present and propose an axiomatic characterization of the relations over sets which are
consistent in terms of flexibility with a preference P: For this we consider the following axioms:
Restricted Monotonicity (RM)
" x,y ˛ X, xPy implies {x,y}~{x}, and ¬(xPy ) implies {x,y}@{x}.
Indifference Consistency: (IC)
" x ˛ X, " A,B ˛ 2X, s.t. x ˛ X/A ¨ B and A ⊆B,     A ¨ {x}~A fi  B ¨ {x}~B.
Strict Preference Consistency: (SPC)
" x ˛ X, " A,B ˛ 2X s.t. x ˛ X/A ¨ B,       [A ¨ {x}@A and B ¨ {x}@B ] fi  A ¨ B ¨ {x}@A ¨ B.
7(RM) is also used in Arlegi and Nieto [1]. It is related to the axiom of Strong Monotonicity (SM),
used by Pattanaik and Xu [13] and Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [5], according to which, for any  x,y ˛ X,
{x,y}@{x}; and which is used in a freedom of choice context. (RM) reinterprets (SM) in a context of
preference for flexibility. By (RM), we restrict the cases in which value is attached to having a wider
choice, and we consider that this happens only when there is some doubt in the basic preferences.
(IC) establishes that, if an alternative does not add any value to a given set A, then neither does it to a
set which contains A. This property is related to the standard theory of consumer behavior. (SPC) states
that, if an additional alternative increases the flexibility of a pair of sets, then it should likewise affect the
union of those sets.
Theorem 1: Let $ be a binary relation defined on 2X, and let P be an asymmetric binary relation
defined on X. $ is P-consistent in terms of preference for flexibility (it satisfies (2.1)) if and only if $
satisfies (RM), (IC) and (SPC).
Proof: It is easy to check that, if $ satisfies (2.1), then it also satisfies (RM), (IC) and (SPC). We will
only prove the inverse implication: Let A ⊆X, #A=m, and let x ˛ X/A: If there exists ai ˛ A such that aiPx,
then, by (RM), {ai,x}~{ai}. As {ai} ⊆A, by (IC), A ¨ {x}~A
If there does not exist ai ˛ A such that aiPx, then, by (RM), " ai ˛ A {ai,x}@{ai}, which by (SPC)
implies {a1} ¨ {a2} ¨ {x}@{a1} ¨ {a2}. Also by (SPC), the last relation implies in its turn
{a1} ¨ {a2} ¨ {a3} ¨ {x}@{a1} ¨ {a2} ¨ {a3}. By repeating as often as necessary, we have
{a1} ¨ {a2} ¨ ... ¨ {an} ¨ {x} @ {a1} ¨ {a2} ¨ ... ¨ {am}, that is, A ¨ {x}@A  n
(2.1) only establishes conditions of consistency with P in cases of enlargements (reductions) in sets.
This does not greatly restrict the structure of the possible orders on the opportunity sets; in fact,
intransitive relations or clearly incomplete relations on opportunity sets can satisfy (2.1). From now on,
8the paper focuses mainly on those orders which satisfy (2.1) and are at the same time complete and
transitive (complete preorders or “complete orderings”).
This does not mean that we assume that the natural way to compare sets is with a complete and
transitive preference. The previous result shows, in a way, that incompleteness in the basic preferences
leads to incompleteness in the preferences over sets. The question now is: given a complete and transitive
way to order opportunity sets (as in the freedom of choice models), is it possible to interpret it in terms
of flexibility, that is, as a P-consistent ordering?
Definition. Let P be an asymmetric binary relation defined on X. A binary relation on opportunity sets
will be said to be a P-consistent ordering of opportunity sets in terms of preference for flexibility if
it is complete and transitive, and satisfies (2.1) with respect to P.
Remark: It is easy to prove that, if P is an asymmetric binary relation defined on X , and $ is a P-
consistent ordering of opportunity sets, then P is transitive.
As justified before, unlike Kreps, we try to formalize the idea of preference for flexibility in terms of
the basic preferences, represented by the binary relation P . However, there is some relation between
Kreps’ approach and the one adopted in this paper.
Kreps [10] proposes a representation theorem for the preference for flexibility, but with no formal
remission to preferences on the alternatives individually considered. The ex-ante conditions that he
imposes on orderings of sets to assert that they display preference for flexibility are the following:
(3.1) " A,B ˛ 2X, A ⊆B fi  B$A
(3.2) " A,B,C ˛ 2X, A~A ¨ B fi " C ˛ 2X, A ¨ C~A ¨ B ¨ C
That is, enlarging an opportunity set never makes things worse for the decision maker ((3.1)), and if a
set B does not add any additional value to another set A , then nor will it do so to a different set
9containing A ((3.2)). Therefore, Kreps concentrates on representing orderings which satisfy (3.1) and
(3.2). Kreps’ representation theorem establishes in advance one variable s (the state of the individual’s
possible tastes or preferences), and one cardinal utility function dependent on s,   U : X X S fi ´ , so that
orderings on 2X satisfy (3.1) y (3.2) if and only if there exists a finite set S, and a function U : X X S fi ´ ,
such that the function v : 2 X fi ´  defined by v(A) = Σ
s S∈ ∈
[ ( , )]maxU x s
x A
 " A ˛ 2X, represents $. According to
this representation, whenever the decision maker orders the opportunity sets satisfying properties (3.1)
and (3.2), we may interpret that there is an underlying set of utility functions representing different
orderings on X, orderings which are contingent to different possible states of the world (possible states
of future preferences). Then, when the agent evaluates an opportunity set, she is behaving as if she were
adding up the different maximal utilities she could reach with the elements of the set for each state si of S.
The following Lemma relates the class of complete P-consistent orderings according to a given P ,
with the class of orderings represented by Kreps:
Lemma 1: Let  $ be a complete and transitive binary relation defined on 2X, and let P be an asymmetric
binary relation defined on X . If $ is P-consistent in terms of preference for flexibility, then it satisfies
(3.1) and (3.2).
Proof: (3.1) is straightforward from condition (2.1). To prove that (3.2) is also satisfied, note that, if $
is P-consistent in terms of preference for flexibility, then A~A¨ B implies that " bi˛ B\A there exists ai ˛ A
such that aiPbi; otherwise, by (2.1), A ¨ {bi}@A, and by the monotonic character of $ and transitivity,
A ¨ B @A, which is absurd. Therefore, if " bi˛ B\A there exists ai˛ A such that aiPbi, then " bi ˛ B\A there
exists ai˛ A ¨ C such that aiPbi; Take b1,...,bn ˛ B\A. By (2.1) A ¨ C ¨ {b1}~A ¨ C. For the same reason
A ¨ C ¨ {b1} ¨ {b2}~A ¨ C ¨ {b1}, and by transitivity A ¨ C ¨ {b1} ¨ {b2}~A ¨ C. By repeating as often as
necessary we reach A¨ C¨ B~A ¨ C.  n
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In other words, although the starting point in our approach is quite different to the one in Kreps’
work, the class of orderings consistent in terms of preference for flexibility with a given preference P is
representable à la Kreps. However, the inverse implication is not true in general. In particular, if a
complete ordering satisfies (3.1) and (3.2), this does not imply that it satisfies (RM) or (SPC).
Examples:
• Let X={x,y,z}; P=[(x,y)], and let $ be defined by: " A,B ˛ 2X, A$B «  #A ‡ #B. It is easy to check that
this ordering (“counting” the alternatives) satisfies (3.1) and (3.2), (and also (IC) and (SPC)), but not
(RM).
• Let X={x,y,z}, and let $ defined by: $ = [{x,y,z}~{x,y}]@[{x,z}~{y,z}]@[{x}~{y}~{z}]. $
satisfies (3.1) and (3.2), but not (SPC), because {x,z}@{x};  {y,z}@{y}, but  {x,y,z}~{x,y}.
In the first example, the ordering is not consistent with the given relation P , but could be consistent
with another different asymmetric relation P (in fact it is consistent with an hypothetical P ¢ = ∅). The
second example is in a way more relevant, as it is impossible to find any asymmetric relation P on X
such that $ is consistent with it: According to the definition of P-consistency, {x,y,z}~{x,y} would
imply xPz or xPy , and this would imply {x,z}~{x} or  {y,z}~{y}.
This point might lead us to investigate the necessary and sufficient axiomatic conditions for a
complete ordering of opportunity sets for there to exist an asymmetric relation P which parametrizes it
in terms of flexibility. The following theorem answers this question. For this, the two following axioms
are considered:
Weak Simple Monotonicity (WSM): " x,y ˛ X, {x,y}${x}
Simple Relevance (SR): " x,y ˛ X, {x,y}@{x} or {x,y}@{y}
11
(WSM) is a weak version of (RM). It claims that never is the availability of two opportunities worse
than that of one of them alone. (SR) imposes, for any pair of elements, the existence of at least one
which is relevant, that is, which contributes to the flexibility.
Theorem 2. Let $ be a binary relation defined on 2X. There exists an asymmetric binary relation P on
X such that $ is P-consistent in terms of preference for flexibility if and only if $ satisfies (WSM),
(SR), (IC) and (SPC).
Proof: It is straightforward that, given an asymmetric relation P , (RM) implies (WSM) and (SR).
Therefore, the proof of the sufficient part of Theorem 2 is provided by the proof of the sufficient part of
Theorem 1. For the necessary part, we must prove that if a binary relation $ satisfies the axioms, then
we can find an asymmetric relation P such that $ is P-consistent. By (WSM), " x,y ˛ X, {x,y}@{x} or
{x,y}~{x}. We will show that, in particular, $ is consistent with the relation on X defined by: P={(x,y)
such that {x,y}~{x}}: (From (SR) we have that P defined as above is an asymmetric relation).
Moreover, $ is P-consistent in terms of preference for flexibility. For that we must prove:
 (i): " A ˛ 2X, "  x ˛ X/A, $ ai ˛ A such that aiPx fi  A ¨ {x}~A
 and (ii): " A ˛ 2X, x ˛ X/A, /∃ai ˛ A such that aiPx fi  A ¨ {x}@A
(i): Let A ˛ 2X, x ˛ X/A. If there exists ai ˛ A such that aiPx, then by definition {ai,x}~{ai}. By (IC),
this implies A ¨ {x}~A. (ii): Let A ˛ 2X, x ˛ X/A. If there does not exist any ai ˛ A such that aiPx, then,
" ai˛ X, ¬({ai,x}~{ai}), which by (WSM) implies that " ai˛ X, {ai,x}@{ai}. Let i=1,…,#A. If #A=1
we are done. Otherwise, {a1,x}@{a1} and {a2,x}@{a2}, which by (SPC) implies {a1,a2,x}@{a1 a2}. If
#A>2, {a3,x}@{a3}, which again by (SPC) implies {a1,a2,a3,x}@{a1,a2,a3}. By repetition, we reach
A ¨ {x}@A. n
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Notice that Theorem 2 shows the condition for any binary relation on 2X to exist an asymmetric
relation P which parametrizes it, and not only for complete orderings of sets.Theorem 2 has some formal
analogies with the well known results of Sen [16] concerning rational choice. He imposes conditions, as
a  or g , on the choice functions to assert that certain binary relations between the individual alternatives
rationalize them. Theorem 2 imposes certain conditions on the set orderings sufficient to assert that there
exists a binary relation that rationalizes those orderings, but in terms of flexibility. In that sense, the
induced relation P={(x,y) such that {x,y}~{x}}, used in the proof, plays the role played by the
revealed preference in the standard rationality models.
Theorem 2 shows no evident formal relationship with Kreps’ characterization. But we know by
Lemma 1 that such a relationship exists: given an asymmetric relation P , the set of P-consistent
orderings are a subset of the orderings characterized by Kreps (but not the reverse). Then, it is worth
posing the following question: Is it possible to characterize the particular form of Kreps’ representation
function, for the particular case of the P-consistent orderings? This point leads us to the following
theorem of representation in terms of P:
Theorem 3. Let X be a finite set of alternatives, let P be an asymmetric binary relation defined on X ,
and  let $ be a complete and transitive ordering defined on 2X, then:
$ is P-consistent in terms of preference for flexibility if and only if there exists a finite set S, and a
function U : X X S fi ´ , such that v(A)= Σ
s S∈ ∈
[ ( , )]maxU x s
x A
 " A˛ 2X represents $, and such that U satisfies the
following property with respect to P:
" A ˛ 2X, " ai ˛ A, ai ˛ {maxP(A)} « $ s s.t. U(ai,s)>U(aj,s) " aj ˛ A, aj „  ai (3.3)
Proof: By Lemma 1, if $ is P-consistent, it satisfies (3.1) and (3.2); hence, according to the
representation theorem of Kreps [10],  there exists a finite set S and a function U : X X S fi ´ , such that
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" A ˛ 2X, v(A)= Σ
s S∈ ∈
[ ( , )]maxU x s
x A
 represents $. We must prove that $ verifies (3.3) with respect to P . Let
us suppose that this is not true; then, there are two possibilities. The first one is that for some A˛ 2X, there
exists ai ˛ {maxP(A)} such that " sj ˛ S, $ aj „ ai, aj ˛ A, and U(aj,s)‡ U(aj,s); in that case,
Σ
s S∈ ∈
[ ( , )]
/{ }










, and if v represents $, then A/{ai}~A, and consequently $ is not P-
consistent. The second possibility is that for some A˛ 2X, there exists ai∉{maxP(A)}, and s ˛ S, such that
" aj˛ A, aj„ ai, U(ai,s)>U(aj,s); but if ai ∉{maxP(A)}, in this case there exists aj ˛ A such that ajPai. Let
us take the set {ai,aj}. By hypothesis and by definition of v, v({ai,aj})>v({aj}). If v represents $, then
{ai,aj}@{aj}, therefore $ is not P-consistent.
On the other hand, we must prove that if there exists a finite set S, and a function U : X X S fi ´
satisfying (3.3), and such that the function v represents $, then $ is P-consistent. Again, in order to
demonstrate this part of the proof, it is sufficient to prove the following:
(i) " A ˛ 2X, " x ˛ X/A, $ ai ˛ A such that aiPx fi  A ¨ {x}~A
and (ii) " A ˛ 2X, " x ˛ X/A, /∃ai ˛ A such that aiPx fi  A ¨ {x}@A
(i): Let A ˛ 2X, x ˛ X/A. If there exists ai ˛ A such that aiPx, then x ∉{maxP(A ¨ {x}}). By (3.3) it is
implied that, " s ˛ S, there exists aj ˛ A, such that U(aj,s) ‡ U(x,s), consequently
Σ
s S∈ ∈





s S∈ ∈ ∪
[ ( , )]
{ }




, therefore A ¨ {x}~A.
(ii): Let A ˛ 2X, x ˛ X/A. If there is no ai ˛ A such that aiPx, then x ˛ {maxP(A ¨ {x}}. This implies that
there exists s˛ S such that U(x,s)>U(ai,s) " ai ˛ A, consequently Σ
s S∈ ∈





s S∈ ∈ ∪
[ ( , )]
{ }





therefore A ¨ {x}@A.  n
Interpretation of Theorem 3: In our approach, the relation P over the alternatives, and the consistency
condition (2.1) with respect to P, are the primitives in the model. From them, we arrive at orderings on
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opportunity sets which, by Lemma 1, are within the general framework of Kreps, but which are
parametrized by the preference P . This reveals that any P-consistent ordering must be also
representable in terms of utility contingent functions, and indicates that there must be some specific
connection between the structure of P and the structure of the utility functions; that is, the requirement of
consistency with P must unavoidably constrain the type of representation. This restriction is given by
property (3.3), which demands that one alternative is not dominated by means of P by any other in the
its set, if and only if there exists a state s˛ S where the alternative is the best in the set.
Property (3.3) characterizes the particular form of Kreps’ representation functions in the case of P-
consistent rankings: Given a relation P, given a P-consistent ordering, and given a Kreps-type function
representing it, then, the function must verify (3.3). On the other hand, given a relation P , and given a
Kreps-type function satisfying (3.3) according to P , then such a function represents a P-consistent
ordering of the opportunity sets. This means that P parametrizes, not only the class of P-consistent
orderings, but also, the set of Kreps-type functions which can characterize them.
Furthermore, (3.3) implies that, given P, and one function like v representing a P-consistent ordering
of opportunity sets, then we can define it as: xPy « U(x,s)‡ U(y,s) " s, with strict inequality for some s.
However, it is possible to prove that the inverse implication is not true: given P , it is not true that any
function U satisfying xPy« U(x,s)‡ U(y,s) " s, with strict inequality for some s, is useful to represent an
ordering consistent in terms of preference for flexibility with P. We can then propose the following
Corollary: Let X be a finite set of alternatives, let P be an asymmetric relation defined on X , let $ be a
P-consistent order defined on 2X, and let be a finite set S, and a function U : X X S fi ´ , satisfying (3.3)
and such that v(A) = Σ
s S∈ ∈
[ ( , )]maxU x s
x A
 " A˛ 2X represents $. Let us define a function f : X fi ´ , such that:
" x,y ˛ X, f (x)> f (y) « U(x,s) ‡ U(y,s) " s, with strict inequality for some s.
Then, f  (weakly) represents P; that is, " x,y ˛ X  xPy fi  f (x)> f (y).
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4. Examples.
Below we study different criteria for ordering opportunity sets taken from the related literature, and in
particular, from the freedom of choice literature. We analyze how to interpret them in terms of preference
for flexibility, that is, they are described as consistent rankings according to a given relation P , and,
therefore, we propose ways to represent them in the form established by Theorem 3.
Proposition 1. Let P be an asymmetric binary relation defined on X such that " x,y ˛ X; x ≠ y; xPy or
yPx. Let $ be a complete ordering defined on 2X. Then $ is P-consistent in terms of preference for
flexibility if and only if $ is the standard indirect utility criterion (A$B « maxR(A)RmaxR(B)) (where R is
the weak preference relation associated to P, which is complete and transitive)
Proof. The necessary part of the implication is quite straightforward; we will prove only the sufficient
part: We must prove that, given P as defined, if $ is P-consistent, then $ is the standard indirect utility
criterion. For this we have to prove:
(i): maxR(A)PmaxR(B) fi  A@B
(ii): maxR(A)ImaxR(B) fi  A~B (where I denotes the indifference relation associated to P)
(i): Given the formal structure of P , " A˛ 2X, maxR(A) exists and is unique. Idem with maxR(B). Let
a1=maxR(A), b1=maxR(B). By hypothesis, a1Pb1. As $ is a P-consistent binary relation, and P is
asymmetric, then {a1,b1}~{a1}@{b1}. As P is connected, " ai ˛ A, a1 ≠ ai, a1Pai; and " bi ˛ A, b1 ≠ bi,
b1Pbi. Hence, by condition (2.1) repeatedly applied, {a1}~A, and {b1}~B. As $ is a complete ordering,
A@B.
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(ii): Let a1= maxR(A), b1= maxR(B). As P is connected, maxR(A)ImaxR(B) implies a1=b1. By
reflexivity of ~, {a1}~{b1}, then, as in (i), by property (2.1), {a1}~A and {b1}~B. And by transitivity
and completeness of $, A~B.
Proposition 2. Let P be an asymmetric, transitive and connected binary relation defined on X, and let
$ be a complete ordering defined on 2X. Then, $ is P-consistent in terms of preference for flexibility if
and only if there exists a set S, and a function U : X X S fi ´ , such that S={s1}; U: ( X ,s1) fi ´  represents P;
and v(A)= Σ
s S∈ ∈
[ ( , )]maxU x s
x A
 " A˛ 2X represents $.
Proof: By Proposition 1, $ is the indirect utility criterion, that is, " A,B ˛ 2X, A$B « maxR(A)RmaxR(B).
Then, let U : X X S fi ´  such that S={s1} and U: ( X ,s1) fi ´  represents P ( " x,y ˛ X, xPy «
« U(x,s1)>U(y,s1)): By the definition of function v, " A ˛ 2X, v(A)=U(maxR(A),s1), as $ is the indirect
utility criterion, " A,B ˛ 2X, A$B « maxR(A)RmaxR(B); as U represents P , maxR(A)RmaxR(B) «
« U(maxR(A),s1) ‡ U(maxR(B),s1); and by the definition of v, U(maxR(A),s1) ‡ U(maxR(B),s1) «
« v(A) ‡ v(B), that is, v represents $.
On the other hand, let the relations P, $, and the functions U, v defined in the hypothesis, such that
v(A)= Σ
s S∈ ∈
[ ( , )]maxU x s
x A
 " A˛ 2X represents $; we must prove that $ is P-consistent. For that we must
prove:
(i) " A ˛ 2X, " x ˛ X/A, $ ai ˛ A such that aiPx fi A ¨ {x}~A.
   and (ii) " A ˛ 2X, " x ˛ X/A, /∃ai ˛ A such that aiPx fi  A ¨ {x}@A.
(i): By the definition of functions U and v, if there exists ai ˛ A such that aiPx, then v(A ¨ {x})=v(A).
If v represents $, then A ¨ {x}~A. (ii): By the formal structure of P , if there does not exist ai ˛ A such
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that aiPx, then xPai " ai ˛ A. That is, maxR(A ¨ {x})=x and xPmaxR(A). Therefore, by the definition of U
and v, v(A ¨ {x})> v(A). If v represents $, then A ¨ {x}@A.     n
From Propositions 1 and 2 we have that, when there is no uncertainty (the binary relation P relates all
the possible pairs), the rule obtained is the one based on the indirect utility of the opportunity sets.
Proposition 2 illustrates this fact, since it shows that such a situation can be interpreted as the existence
of a unique state of the future preferences.
Proposition 3. Let P be the empty binary relation defined on X , and let $ be a complete ordering
defined on 2X. $ is P-consistent in terms of preference for flexibility if and only if it satisfies that
" A,B ˛ 2X, B ⊂A fi A@B. The proof is quite straightforward, so it is omitted.
Many rules in the freedom of choice literature satisfy the monotonic feature of Proposition 3. We have
selected some paradigmatic ones:
The cardinalist ranking of opportunity sets ($#) is characterized and defined in Pattanaik and Xu [13]
by: " A,B ˛ 2X, A$#B «  #A ‡ #B.
The leximax rule ($L) is defined in Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [5] as follows: Let R be a complete
ordering defined on X. Let u 
R 















), 0n-s] " A ˛ 2X. And let ‡
L
 be the lexicographic order on ´ n. Then
" A,B ˛ 2X, A $L B «  vR(A) ‡ LvR(B).
The cardinality-first lexicographic relation ($CFL), and the preference-first lexicographic relation
($PFL) are defined as follows, also in Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [5]:   Let R be a complete ordering on
X ,
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" A,B ˛ 2X , A$CFL B «  [#A>#B] or  [#A=#B and maxR(A)R maxR(B)]
" A,B ˛ 2X ,  A$PFL B «  maxR(A)PmaxR(B) or  [maxR(A)I maxR(B) and #A ‡ #B]
Corollary. If P= ∅ then $#, $L, $LCP and $LPC are P-consistent in terms of preference for flexibility.
To prove this, we must simply take into account that the four criteria satisfy that, " A,B ˛ 2X,
B ⊂A fi A@B.
Proposition 4. Let P be the empty binary relation defined on X , and let $ be a complete ordering
defined on 2X. $ is P-consistent in terms of preference for flexibility if and only if there exists a set S,
and a function U : X X S fi ´ , such that U satisfies (3.3), and " x ˛ X there exists s˛ S such that
U(x,s)>U(y,s) " y ˛ X, y ≠ x; and v(A)= Σ
s S∈ ∈
[ ( , )]maxU x s
x A
 " A˛ 2X represents $.
Proof: By Theorem 3, given an asymmetric binary relation P , and a complete ordering $ which is P-
consistent, then there exists a set S, and a function U : X X S fi ´ , such that v(A)= Σ
s S∈ ∈
[ ( , )]maxU x s
x A
 " A˛ 2X
represents $, and such that function U satisfies (3.3). We must then prove that, when P is the empty
relation, for any x ˛ X there exists s ˛ S  such that U(x,s)>U(y,s) " y ˛ X, y ≠ x: For any x ˛ X, let X\{x}. As
P is empty, x ˛ maxP(X), hence, by (3.3) there exists s ˛ S such that U(x,s)>U(y,s) " y ˛ X, y ≠ x .
On the other hand, we must prove that, given the empty relation P; the complete ordering $; and the
functions U, v defined in the hypothesis, such that v(A)= Σ
s S∈ ∈
[ ( , )]maxU x s
x A
 " A˛ 2X represents $, then $ is
P-consistent. By these definitions, " A ˛ 2X, " x ˛ X/A, v(A ¨ {x})>v(A), and if v represents $, this
implies that, " A ˛ 2X, " x ˛ X/A, A ¨ {x}@A. Therefore, " A,B ˛ 2X, B ⊂A fi A@B. By Proposition 3, this
implies that $ is P-consistent with the empty relation P. n
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The case shown by Propositions 3 and 4 is at the opposite extreme from that of Propositions 1 and 2.
On the one hand, the complete absence of certainty, (displayed by the fact that P is empty), gives full
value to flexibility in choice: any additional alternative implies a strict improvement. On the other hand,
while in Propositions 1 and 2 the absence of uncertainty was associated with a unique state of the future
preferences, when the uncertainty is total, there must be, at least, as many states in S as there are
elements in X. Below we propose some examples to represent $#, $L, $LCP and $LPC, that may clarify
the meaning of the previous arguments. The proofs of the examples are omitted.
Example 1: Let S={s1,s2..., sn}, X={x1,x2..., xn} (#S=#X=n), and let c be any positive constant value,
let U : X X S fi ´  be defined by:  " xi˛ X, U x s
c j i








[ ( , )]maxU x s
x A
 " A ˛ 2X represents $#.
Example 2: Let S={s1,s2..., sn}, X={x1,x2..., xn}, (#S=#X=n). Let R be a complete ordering defined on
X , let X/I={C1,C2...,Cm} be the quotient set determined by I such that CmPCm-1P···PC1, and let nm=
=max(#Ci)
Let U : X X S fi ´  be defined by: " xi ˛ Ck ⊆ X, U x s
n j i
j ii j









[ ( , )]maxU x s
x A
 " A˛ 2X represents $L.
Examples 1 and 2 satisfy the conditions of Proposition 4, but the different type of information about
the agent’s tastes finds a different expression when represented by means of function U. In the first
example, there is no preference (either certain or “probable”) on basic alternatives; therefore, any of them
has an equal chance of being the best one in the future. Under the leximax rule there is a preference
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relation, R, which can be interpreted as “uncertain” or “probable”, and which reveals more about the
agent’s tastes. So, when representing by function U, any alternative can be the best one in future, but
according to a consistent hierarchy in relation to R.
Example 3: Let X={x1,x2..., xn}, S={s0,s1..., sn}, (#S=n+1). Let R be a complete ordering defined on X;
let X/I ={C1,C2...,Cm} the quotient set determined by I such that CmPCm-1P···PC1.





















[ ( , )]maxU x s
x A
 " A˛ 2X represents $CFL.
Example 4. Let X={x1,x2..., xn}, S={s0,s1..., sn}, (#S=n+1). Let R be a complete ordering defined on X;
let X/I ={C1,C2...,Cm} the quotient set determined by I such that CmPCm-1P···PC1.





















[ ( , )]maxU x s
x A
 " A˛ 2X represents $PFL.
5. Summary and conclusions
We have analyzed orderings on opportunity sets in order to formalize the concept of preference for
flexibility. We are inspired by the interpretation of this notion as suggested by Koopmans [9] and Kreps
[10]. Although the notion of preference for flexibility and that of preference for freedom of choice seem
to be similar, there are some causal differences: in the numerous recent works about freedom of choice,
the value of having more to choose from is not necessarily incompatible with preferences over the
alternatives which are certain and complete and, therefore, these works appeal to the intrinsic value of the
mere availability of more possibilities to choose from. Certainly, in some contexts, freedom of choice
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can be endowed with some value per se, but the motivation of the present work lies in the hypothesis
that, often, insufficiently certain tastes or preferences can be the real underlying cause of the wish for
more to choose from. This conjecture would justify the need to provide a coherent formalization of the
relation between the preference for more opportunities (termed “preference for flexibility” under this
interpretation) and uncertainty in tastes.
A reasonable approach to this problem can be achieved by looking at the very structure of the
preferences over the basic alternatives, as a primitive in the decision procedure. Therefore, we are
required to distinguish (in a return to the distinction proposed by Harsanyi) between those preferences
over basic alternatives which are sufficiently certain, and those which are doubtful, and thereby,
establish the subsequent modeling of a basic preferences structure to match such a distinction. We link
preferences on opportunity sets with the preference over the basic alternatives by means of a minimal
consistency condition (Condition (2.1)), and the result turns out to fall within the general domain of
Kreps’ proposal. Condition (3.3) establishes the connection between Kreps’ approach and that of this
paper.
Furthermore, it is noted how some well-known rules for ordering opportunity sets, also given as
extensions of basic preferences, belong to the class of orderings proposed in this work, and precisely
these rules can be interpreted as special cases of preference for flexibility, which are related to different
degrees of uncertainty. This circumstance has its formal reflection in the fact that each of these rules
arises from a particular form of the basic preferences structure, and also from particular forms to be
represented by the Kreps’ formula. The formal particularizations obtained in each case fit the main
hypothesis of this paper, that is, that the value of having more to choose from is directly related to the
degree of uncertainty, displayed by the “absolutely certain” basic preference. Precisely those rules where
the availability of more opportunities is more highly valued (the decision maker displays more preference
for flexibility), require, on the one hand, the “certain” part of the basic preferences to be “smaller”, and
on the other hand, when representing them, the existence of possible states of the future preferences
which allow for their reversals.
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This paper has focused its attention on complete orderings on opportunity sets, which seem to be
more appropriate for the purpose of political evaluation. Nevertheless, it would also be interesting to
approach the analysis of incomplete orders, which, as hinted at by Sen ([19],p.19), could arise when
trying to describe the preference for flexibility or for freedom of choice. In fact, the initial results in
Section 3 are not constrained to the assumption that the orderings on sets are complete, so that, this
opens many possibilities for further investigation.
Finally, there are some additional aspects related to comparisons of opportunity sets, studied in
merely a few recent works, but which are worthy of more thorough research. For example, the incidence
of variety between the alternatives within opportunity sets (Bavetta and Del Seta [3], Nehring and Puppe
[11]), or the consequences of the presence of evaluation costs (Neme, Nieto and Quintas [12]).
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